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COMMENTS
The Medical Malpractice Damages Cap: What is Included?
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1)' provides for a damages cap
which limits the liability of qualified health care providers for injuries which result
from their malpractice. An individual physician may be held liable only for an
amount up to $100,000, and a plaintiff's recovery is limited to a total of $500,000
(the Patient's Compensation Fund pays up to $400,000 of that amount). Following
an introduction to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act and Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1), this comment will examine the appropriateness of
applying the liability cap to three types of claims: loss of consortium claims,
vicarious liability claims, and claims for an exclusively economic injury. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has never directly addressed the application of the
damages cap to these three types of claims.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT AND LOUISIANA
REVISED STATUTES 40:1299.42(B)(1)
In the early 1970s, the institution of medical malpractice suits increased
dramatically, capturing national attention and causing concern in Louisiana about
the "medical malpractice crisis."2 Insurance companies then made an alarming
announcement: it was no longer profitable to provide malpractice insurance
because the unpredictability of the amount of claims "made it difficult if not impos-
sible to predict future liability verdicts and thus to assess appropriate premiums that
would allow a reasonable profit."3 In Louisiana, four medical malpractice in-
surance companies4 abandoned this market altogether, leaving only two providers'
in the state in 1975.6 Between the remaining two providers, insurance premiums
increased at rates as high as 300% over the few years leading up to 1975, and in
that year, both of the remaining insurers considered leaving Louisiana..
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. R.S. 40:1299.42 (Supp. 1998).
2. Robin S. Shapiro et al.,A Survey of Sued and Nonsued Physicians and Suing Patients, AMA,
October 1989 (nationally, "80% of all medical malpractice lawsuits between 1935 and 1975 were filed
after 1970"); Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment
at 7, Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992) (No. 92-0559) (In Louisiana. for those
insured by St. Paul Insurance Co., payment for malpractice claims doubled from 1973 to 1974 and
doubled again in 1975. The frequency of claims increased from 84 claims in 1968 to 384 claims in
1974. In 1968 there was one claim for every 20 doctors while in 1974 there was one claim for every
6 doctors. The average payout per claim increased from $4,883.00 in 1968 to $10,137.00 in 1974.).
3. Frank M. McClellan, Medical Malpractice: Law, Tactics, and Ethics 79-80 (1994).
4. Aetna Ins. Co., Travelers Ins. Co., Commercial Union Ins. Co., and Insurance Co. of America.
5. Hartford Ins. Co. and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
6. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment at
7, Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992) (No. 92-0559).
7. Id.
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When state legislatures around the country closely examined medical
malpractice insurance premiums, they responded by enacting statutes "in an effort
to alleviate the problems felt by doctors with malpractice litigation."' The
Louisiana Legislature enacted the Medical Malpractice Act in 1975, which set a
limit on damages for medical malpractice claims at $500,000.' One of the reasons
was because, as of 1975, there had never been a malpracticejudgment or settlement
in Louisiana above the $500,000 level.'0
In 1992, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the Act in Butler v. Flint
Goodrich," stating: "Overall, the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act represents
a reasonable but imperfect balance between the rights of victims and those of
health care providers. It does not violate the state or federal constitutions.""2
Although this is the only case in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held the act
constitutional, in Chamberlain v. State, 3 the court again mentioned Butler without
overruling or discommending it:
We recently addressed the constitutionality of a similar statutory measure
placing a ceiling on medical malpractice liability in Butler v. Flint
Goodrich Hospital of Dillard University .... There, we upheld the
legislature's power to enact a ceiling on liability of private health care
providers.., over constitutional challenges based on the equal protection
and access to court provisions.'4
This portion of the case provides more authority for the constitutionality of the
Medical Malpractice Act.
In the Medical Malpractice Act, the Louisiana Legislature provided for the
patient's compensation fund ("PCF")5 and for a statutory cap on damages by
enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B) which limits a patient's
recovery from qualified health care providers. 6 The legislature's purpose in
8. Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice: Medical Injury, Malpractice litigation, and
Patient Compensation 7 (1993).
9. La. R.S. 40:1299.37-.48 (1992 and Supp. 1999).
10. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment, at
7, Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992) (No. 92-0559).
11. 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 909,113 S. Ct. 2338 (1993).
12. Butler, 607 So. 2d at 521.
13. 624 So. 2d 874, 879 (La. 1993).
14. Id. (citations omitted). See also Payne v. New Orleans Gen. Hosp., 627 So. 2d 221,223 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1993) (Chamberlain provides authority for the validity of the holding in Butler because
the Louisiana Supreme Court specifically mentioned it without overruling it or disapproving it); Moody
v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 657 So. 2d 236, 237-38 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995) ("We find that the statutory
cap is constitutional.... [Tihe Butler case appears to have put an end to the constitutional attacks
against the limitation provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act"). But see Whitnell v. Silverman, 686
So. 2d 23 (La. 1996) (which questions the constitutionality of the cap in dicta).
15. La. R.S. 40:1299.44 (Supp. 1999).
16. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B) (1992) provides:
(1) The total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of a
patient exclusive of future medical care and related benefits as provided in R.S. 40:1299.43
shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars plus interest and cost.
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enacting the Medical Malpractice Act, and especially Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1299.42(B) was to provide for affordable health care by preventing tremendous
liability and excessive insurance premiums. Chief Justice Dixon has stated that
"the $500,000 limitation on recovery of Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1299.42(B)(1) substantially furthers a legitimate state purpose. In order to
prevent hospital closures, significant restriction of physician practices, and
substantial rapid increases in health care costs, control of medical malpractice
insurance premiums was determined to be necessary."'"
While the cap on damages provides protection to physicians from large general
damage awards, it excludes damages awarded for "future medical care and related
benefits."' 8 Future medical care and related benefits are defined as "all reasonable
medical, surgical, hospitalization, physical rehabilitation, and custodial services and
includes drugs, prosthetic devices, and other similar materials reasonably necessary
in the provision of such services, after the date of the injury."' 9 Although the
statute excepts "future medical care," in a seeming contradiction, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has interpreted this category of damages to include "all past,
present, and future medical and related care services necessitated by a qualified
health care provider's malpractice-not just what is usually thought of as 'future'
medical needs."'" The purpose for the exclusion of this category of damages from
the cap was to provide malpractice victims with "a speedy, convenient, and in-
expensive administrative remedy for.., actually incurred medical expenses with-
out limit.... The legislation aims to remedy... the damage cap's harsh tendency
to prune recovery inversely to the injury; and it evinces legislative preference for
an administrative medical relief program over simply raising the cap ...... '
Although excluded from the statutory cap on damages, recovery of future
medical expenses should not have a significant impact on malpractice premiums
because future medical expenses in excess of the statutory cap are paid by the
Patient Compensation Fund.' Importantly, doctors, not insurance companies, pay
the surcharge to the patienit's compensation fund in order to become "qualified
(2) A heath care provider qualified under this Part is not liable for an amount in excess of
one hundred thousand dollars plus interest thereon accruing after April 1, 1991, for all
malpractice claims because of injuries to or death on any one patient.
(3) (a) Any amount due from a judgment or settlement or from a final award in an
arbitration proceeding which is in excess of the total liability of all liable health care
providers, as provided in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, shall be paid from the
patient's compensation fund pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.44(C).
(b) The total amounts paid in accordance with Paragraphs (2) and (3) of this
Subsection shall not exceed the limitation as provided in Paragraph (I) of this
Subsection.
17. Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294, 308 (La. 1989) (Dixon, J., dissenting).
18. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (1992).
19. La. R.S. 40:1299.43(B)(1) (1992).
20. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (1992) (emphasis added).
21. Kelty v. Brumfreed, 633 So. 2d 1210, 1217 (La. 1994) (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 1216-17.
23. La. R.S. 40:1299.43 (1992).
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health care providers." For instance, in 1998, a general practitioner would have
paid a $28,000 surcharge to the Patient Compensation Fund. Any increase in the
price of the surcharge due to the Patient Compensation Fund will be paid by the
doctor himself. The exclusion of future medical expenses will only affect the
amount of the surcharge a doctor must pay into the Patient Compensation Fund
(PCF). Therefore, excluding this specific category of damages does not conflict
with the purpose behind limiting the amount of recoverable damages in malpractice
cases, because, although the health care provider pays the PCF surcharge, the PCF
has a significant role in lowering malpractice insurance premiums.
In addition to future medical expenses, another limitation on the coverage of
the medical malpractice damages cap is that it protects only claims for
"malpractice."'" Acts or omissions by doctors which do not fall within the
definition of "malpractice" are not covered by the liability cap, nor does the PCF
cover these types of acts. In Louisiana, actions against a qualified health care
provider for injuries resulting from defective furniture' or a slip and fall accident'
on the premises of a physician or hospital are not covered. in some cases, plaintiffs
have found it advantageous to have a particular act found outside the scope of
"malpractice" for purposes of avoiding the requirement of going before the
Medical Review Panel.27
However, for purposes of a greater amount of recovery, finding an act or
omission is not "malpractice" may be more harmful than helpful to a plaintiff.
Suppose a plaintiff is injured in a manner that is not "malpractice," and his claim
is no longer subject to the statutory cap on liability. Neither is the Patient
24. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (1992). See Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577 (La. 1992);
Frank L Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, § 21-3(e), at 468 (1997). "Malpractice"
is defined in La. R.S. 40:1299.41(8) (Supp. 1998):
(8) 'Malpractice' means any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health
care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care
provider, to a patient, including failure to render services timely and the handling of a
patient, including loading and unloading of a patient, and also includes all legal
responsibility of a health care provider arising from defects in blood, tissue, transplants,
drugs and medicines, or from defects in or failures of prosthetic devices, implanted in or
used on or in the person of a patient.
25. Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577 (La. 1992) (Where the patient was injured by a
collapsing hospital bed, the Medical Malpractice Act's liability cap was inapplicable because there was
no "malpractice").
26. Stapler v. Alton Oshner Med. Found., 525 So. 2d 1182 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Head v.
Erath Gen. Hosp., 458 So. 2d 579 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984). writ denied, 462 So. 2d 650 (La. 1985). But
see Marsella v. Monmouth Med. Ctr., 540 A.2d 865 (1988) (The court held a hospital visitor's recovery
was limited to the statutory amount in a slip and fall accident. However, the case was decided under
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53 A-10 (1997) which provides that the Act is remedial in nature and should be
liberally construed to afford immunity for furtherance of the public policy of protection of charitable
hospitals. In addition. N.J. Star. Ann. § 2A:53 A-10 (Supp. 1997) limits recovery for injury "as the
result of any one accident," (emphasis added) whereas La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(2) (Supp. 1998) limits
the "total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims") (emphasis added)).
27. See Price v. City of Bossier City, 693 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1997); Hebert v. Federal Express
Corp., 695 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); Baham v. Med. Ctr. of La. at New Orleans, 674 So.
2d 458 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
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Compensation Fund responsible for payment of its part of the plaintiff's claim.
However, the plaintiff could sue the physician personally and receive $800,000, for
example, an award which far exceeds the $500,000 statutory limit. Nevertheless,
if the physician is only insured for the $100,000 to which he expects to be exposed
and the PCF is not liable for the other $400,000, after recovering $100,000 from
the physician's insurer, the plaintiff must recover the remaining $700,000 from the
physician personally. When considered in this light, it is preferable for a plaintiff
to seek recovery for an act of "malpractice" and have recovery of $500,000
"guaranteed," so to speak. The alternative is recovering $800,000 for an act which
is not "malpractice." In that case, the plaintiff would only be assured of recovering
$100,000, especially considering the delays involved in a suspensive appeal.
The cap does not include acts or omissions which are not "malpractice," nor
does it cover injuries resulting from an act or omission of a person who is not
considered a "qualified health care provider", or which injure a person who is not
a "patient"" for purposes of the act.
These exceptions to the cap are certainly logical but may conflict with the
purpose of the damages cap because insurance companies may be liable for more
than the physician's $100,000 usual liability when the physician has purchased a
policy with greater coverage. The Louisiana Third Circuit has held that:
[the] advantage is the enhanced prospect of medical personnel staying in
Louisiana with the result that medical care will be more available to the
citizens of the state. In addition, those injured by medical malpractice
will purportedly be better off in that there will be a solvent defendant
from which to pursue compensation, at the least $100,000 from the health
care provider and up to an additional $400,000 from the Fund.
Three areas which should be covered under the damage cap provided in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1) have not been directly addressed by
the Louisiana Supreme Court: loss of consortium claims derivative of a
malpractice injury, claims of vicarious liability of a physician or hospital, and
claims for economic harm without a concurrent injury. These three categories of
damages are the focus of this comment.
II. A SINGLE LIAnlrrY CAP APPLIES TO Loss OF CONSORTIUM CLAIMS WHICH
DERIVE FROM A PATIENT'S MALPRACTICE INJURY
Loss of consortium claims are recoverable in Louisiana and include loss of
society, service, or support.3 The following categories of persons may recover for
28. Boudreaux v. Vamishung, 713 So. 2d 1192 (La. 1997).
29. Price v. City of Bossier City, 693 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1996).
30. Todd v. Sauls, 647 So. 2d 1366, 1380 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
31. La. Civ. Code art. 2315: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges
him by whose fault it happened to repair it. Damages may include loss of consortium, service, and
society, and shall be recoverable by the same respective categories of persons who would have had a
cause of action for wrongful death of an injured person." See also Maraist & Galligan, supra note 24,
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the loss of consortium they suffer as a result of an injury to a family member:
1) the spouse and children, 2) parents, 3) siblings, and 4) grandparents.32 In cases
of medical malpractice, the question arises whether one liability cap is applicable
to the loss of consortium claim(s) as well as the primary injury, or if there should
be a separate cap for each claim. If only one cap is applicable to both the loss of
consortium claim and direct victim's claim, how are these claims to be ranked when
the damages awarded exceed the damages cap? Although an argument may be
made for pro-rated recovery of each claimant's portion of damages from the
recoverable $500,000, "it seems that in a direct victim/consortium case, from a
fairness perspective, the direct victim should be entitled to primary recovery of
benefits."" Although there has been no ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court on
this issue, two Louisiana circuit courts have held that loss of consortium claims and
claims for injuries from malpractice are subject to a single liability cap.3 "
It is certainly arguable that loss of consortium is a separate injury, distinct
from the injury suffered by the primary victim, and that the loss should be
compensated. In such a case, one who suffers the loss of a spouse's
companionship and support, for instance, has an injury which is wholly distinct
from the physical injury suffered by the spouse himself. However, this argument
cannot overcome the statutory language which provides for the damages cap.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299(B)(1) clearly states: "[t]he total amount
recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of a patient... shall
not exceed five hundred thousand dollars."" While the spouse of a patient may
have a valid loss of consortium claim, that claim would not have arisen without the
injury to the patient himself. Because the statute provides for a limitation on
damages recoverable for injuries to "a patient," the spouse and the patient together
cannot recover more for the injuries to "a patient" than the patient could alone.'
The statute must be interpreted in light of its purpose: to allow for affordable
medical care in Louisiana by limiting malpractice insurance premiums. 7
Therefore, the cap should not be extended in ways the legislature did not intend.
Allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the statutory damages cap for greater recovery
with loss of consortium claims has been rejected by Louisiana circuit courts and
should be rejected as a matter of both statutory interpretation and policy.
In Hollingsworth v. Bowers,3 an infant sustained permanent injuries during
delivery which prevented the use of his left arm. The trial court awarded the child
$500,000 in general damages and $250,000 in loss of earning capacity, and the
§7-2(d), at 154 ("Consortium includes loss of society, service or support; a spouse also may recover for
impairment of sexual relations.").
32. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1.
33. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 24, §21-3(e), at 466 n.66.
34. Hollingsworth v. Bowers, 690 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Moody v. United Nat'l
Ins. Co., 657 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
35. La. R.S. 40:1299(B)(1) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
36. See Todd v. Sauls,647 So. 2d 1366. 1381 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
37. See Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992).
38. 690 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
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mother $250,000 for loss of consortium. It held that separate caps should apply
for the mother and the child. 9 However, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal held that a mother's loss of consortium claim was subject to the same
statutory cap as her child's claims and found that the mother's loss of consortium
claim was derivative of the child's claim. The court stated that "[b]ecause the right
of action in the loss of consortium claim is derived from the primary victim's
injuries, recovery is restricted to the policy's per person limits. Therefore, if the
injured party exhausts the per person limits, the derivative claim is extinguished."
The court here answered affirmatively to the question whether a single damage cap
should apply. It also supported the notion that the primary victim should be
granted the entire amount of recovery where appropriate, instead of allowing the
consortium victim and the direct victim to each recover a percentage of the
available $500,000 according to the amount each would have received without the
statutory limitation on damages.
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit, in Moody v. United National Insurance
Company,4 concluded that loss of consortium claims of the parents of a 14-year-
old child who suffered permanent, irreversible brain damage as a result of
malpractice were "derived from the malpractice injury to their son, did not result
from separate acts of negligence, and therefore [were] included within the same cap
as [the son's] claim."' 2 Thus, the court found that $500,000 is the total amount
recoverable for the primary victim and those family members who have loss of
consortium claims.
Although certainly not equivalent to loss of consortium claims, where there are
multiple claimants in a wrongful death action resulting from malpractice, the
application of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1) should be analogous,
especially since these are also derivative claims. Therefore, an examination of
courts' treatments of those types of claims in Louisiana, as well as the language
interpreting the statute, is appropriate to this inquiry into the liability cap and loss
of consortium claims.
A third circuit case, Todd v. Sauls, 43 involved a survival and wrongful death
action filed by a malpractice victim's survivors. The circuit court held that the
.$500,000 cap applies per patient, not per claim. In other words, it found that the
total, combined recovery for all of the survivors/plaintiffs was limited to $500,000.
It found the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1) clear and
unambiguous. 44 In the opinion, that court explained: "To construe the act to mean
that the cap is per plaintiff is to misread the act.... The clear quantifiers are 'a
patient' as well as 'total amount recoverable' and 'all malpractice claims.' Whether
there is one or eight plaintiffs is of no moment. The physician's negligence is not
39. Id. at 828.
40. Id. at 832.
41. 657 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
42. Id. at 240.
43. 647 So. 2d 1366 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
44. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (1992): "The total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims
for injuries to or death of a patient..... (emphasis added).
2000]
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multiplied by the number of plaintiffs."'45 This reasoning may be easily analogized
to loss of consortium claims because there is the similar problem of the possibility
of multiple claimants in those claims as well. Thus, a single liability cap should
apply for purposes of loss of. consortium claims on the same grounds the court
forwarded in Todd.
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit has also considered the question presented by
multiple claimants and the medical malpractice damages cap in LaMark v. NME
Hospitals.' There, a woman died as a result of malpractice; her husband and four
children brought suit. They sought separate damage caps for their claims relating
to the death of the wife/mother. The court held that "the statutory limitation was
a limitation on the total amount recoverable on all malpractice claims rather than
a limitation on each separate claim for a single act of malpractice." 7 Again, the
interpretation of the statute for wrongful death actions may easily be adopted for
that of loss of consortium because of the similar nature of the claims in that there
may be multiple claimants.
The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted a similar
statute to include the loss of consortium type claim within the damages cap
available to the primary victim. In Starns v. United States," the Fourth Circuit
considered whether the claims of parents whose child was retarded due to
negligence of the delivery staff in a federally-operated hospital49 together with the
child's claim for injuries were covered by a single damages cap under Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.15.o While the district court applied the cap to the child
and his parents separately, the Court of Appeals found all claims which arose from
the child's injuries were subject to a single damages cap. The court found that the
45. Todd, 647 So. 2d at 1381.
46. 542 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989). See also Shepard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.,
545 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (the court found for purposes of insurance coverage that:
A loss of consortium action is a derivative claim of the primary victim's injuries. The
derivative claim does not come into existence until someone else is injured. Because the
right of action in the loss of consortium claim is derived from the primary victim's injuries,
recovery is restricted to the policy's per person limits. Therefore, if the injured party
exhausts the per person limits, the derivative claim is extinguished.).
47. Moody v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 657 So. 2d 236, 240 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
48. 923 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 502 U.S. 809,112 S. Ct. 54 (1991). See also Bulala
v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990).
49. Hill v. United States, 81 F.3d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1996), says of Starns: "the effect of the
statutory scheme placed the tort victim in exactly the same position that would have resulted had the
victim been injured by any other similarly-situated private party. Furthermore, the government, as
tortfeasor, was treated in a precisely analogous fashion to a similarly-situated private tortfeasor."
50. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1984):
In any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for malpractice where the
act or acts of malpractice occurred on or after April 1, nineteen hundred seventy-seven
which is tried by a jury or in any judgment entered against a health care provider in such an
action which is tried without ajury, the total amount recoverable for any injury to, or death
of, a patient shall not exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars.




parents' claims arose from the child's injuries. Because the parents' damages for
the mother's past services, the father's lost wages, and hospital and travel expenses
on the child's behalf were derivative, "they must be included within [the child's]
cap. Accordingly, the limit for all damages in this case is $750,000."' The court
also considered the apportionment of the $750,000 among the parents and the
child. It found that the awards should be ranked as follows: 1) the patient's
compensatory awards, 2) the patient's punitive awards, 3) the non-patients'
derivative awards.5" Accordingly, the court reduced the non-patients' claims first.
Thus, the United States Fourth Circuit has decided that "derivative claims" in
Virginia,53 are subject to the same, single statutory cap as the primary injury, and
these claims are the first to be eliminated when damages are reduced in order to fit
within the allowable statutory amount. Thus, the Fourth Circuit, like the courts in
Louisiana, found that loss of consortium claims are derivative of that of the primary
patient, and as such, are subject to the same single statutory cap as is the patient's
claim.
Allowing a plaintiff or his family to recover a greater amount because of a
derivative loss of consortium claim would thwart the purpose of the statute by
increasing the liability of physicians and hospitals and consequently, increasing the
amount of malpractice insurance and healthcare costs. Therefore, damages for loss
of consortium claims should be subject to the same statutory cap as are the primary
victim's claims, and Louisiana courts have so held.
M1l. THE LLAmBUTY CAP INCLUDES CLAIMs BASED ON-VICARIOUS LABmmrrY
In Louisiana, it is well established that a health care provider may be held
responsible for the negligence of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, or vicarious liability.' According to the Louisiana Third Circuit, "[iut is
generally recognized that where a physician is the employee of a hospital sued by
a patient for particular injuries negligently inflicted during the course of the
patient's treatment, the hospital may be held liable for the injuries sustained by the
patient under the doctrine of respondeat superior."" In one Louisiana case, an
entire surgical team was held vicariously liable because none of the members of
51. Starns, 923 F.2d at 38.
52. Id.
53. See Kerstetter v. United States, 57 F.3d 362,366 (4th Cir. 1995) (Virginia law does not allow
consortium claims). See also Carey v. Foster, 345 F.2d 772 (4th Ci. 1965); Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F.
Supp. 1374 (W.D. Va. 1976).
54. See Tabor v. Doctors Memorial Hosp., 563 So. 2d 233 (La. 1990); Pommier v. ABC Ins. Co.,
715 So. 2d 1270, 1277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998); Gibson v. Bossier City Gen. Hosp., 594 So. 2d 1332,
1342 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Daniel v. St. Francis Cabrini Hosp., 415 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1982); Sudhor v. Medine, 421 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Wells v. Womans Hosp. Found.,
286 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Thompson v. Brent, 245 So. 2d 751 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
See also John D. Hodson, Liability of Hospital or Sanitariumfor Negligence of Physician or Surgeon,
51 A.L.R. 4th 235 (1987).
55. Green v. State Through Southwest Louisiana Charity Hosp., 309 So. 2d 706,713 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ denied, 313 So. 2d 601 (1975).
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that team padded a patient's legs where it was required during an operation, and the
patient suffered a nerve injury as a result.16 In another, a hospital was held
vicariously liable for the negligence of a physician it employed who failed to
diagnose gangrene, resulting in the loss of a 9-year-old child's leg.-7 Arguments
have been made that a hospital (or physician) who acts, not only as a health care
provider, but also as an employer may be held vicariously liable for an employee
and, therefore, should not be granted limited liability under the damages cap in its
capacity as an employer. However, as examined below, neither the language and
structure of the Medical Malpractice Act nor the jurisprudence support this
argument.
By examining the structure of the statutes in the Medical Malpractice Act as
well as the implications of the jurisprudence, it is clear that the damages cap should
apply for purposes of vicarious liability. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.41 (1)
defines a "health care provider" covered under the Medical Malpractice Liability
Act as "any partnership... or corporation whose business is conducted principally
by health care providers, or an officer, employee, partner, member, shareholder,
or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment.""5  The
italicized portion lends authority to the argument that the Louisiana Legislature
intended to protect hospitals and physicians in their capacity as employers. The
statute applies to the employees of health care providers acting within the course
and scope of their employment and the health care providers who employ them.
Because both the employees and the employing entities are covered individually,
it is illogical to conclude that, when these two are connected, the employer's
limitation on liability is somehow lost. Thus, Louisiana Revised Statutes
40:1299.42(B)(1) does not allow a patient to recover more than $500,000 from a
health care provider as an employer, who is vicariously liable for the negligence of
a non-professional employee.
56. Pommier v. ABC Ins. Co., 715 So. 2d 1270 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
57. Green, 309 So. 2d at 713.
58. (Emphasis added). La. R.S. 40:1299.41(1) (Supp. 1999) provides in its entirety:
'Health care provider' means a person, partnership, limited liability partnership, limited
liability company, corporation, facility, or institution licensed by this state to provide health
care or professional services as a physician, hospital, community blood center, tissue bank,
dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, ambulance service under circumstances in
which the provisions of R.S. 40:1299.39 are not applicable, certified registered nurse
anesthetist, nurse midwife, licensed midwife, pharmacist, optometrist, podiatrist,
chiropractor, physical therapist, occupational therapist, psychologist, or any nonprofit
facility considered tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, pursuant
to 26 U.S.C. 501 (c)(3), for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer or cancer-related diseases,
whether or not such a facility is required to be licensed by this state, or any professional
corporation a health care provider is authorized to form under the provisions of Title 12 of
the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, or any partnership, limited liability partnership,
limited liability company, or corporation whose business is conducted principally by health
care providers, or in officer, employee, partner, member, shareholder, or agent thereof acting
in the course and scope of his employment.
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In Goodliffe v. Parish Anesthesia Associates, 9 a nurse was found negligent in
administering anesthesia to a patient who developed TMJ syndrome. The patient
sued the nurse and the nurse's employer, claiming that each of the two was limited
by a separate damage cap. The plaintiff alleged the nurse was negligent in her
actions and that her employer should be found negligent because it improperly
trained the nurse. The court found the nurse negligent but there was no evidence
the employer had been negligent in training her. The employer was found liable
for the $100,000 it provided under an insurance policy as coverage for the nurse.
Even if the patient had asserted that the nurse's employer was vicariously liable for
her negligence, the implication of this decision is that the damages cap of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(13)(1) would still apply: "The judgment is unclear as
to whether [the employer] was held liable individually for its own separate
$100,000 or as the party covering [the nurse's] $100,000. Nevertheless, we agree
that any separate liability.., must be predicated on its own negligence, which was
not shown in this case."' The court here makes no mention of the possibility of
the employer being liable for more than the statutory limit. It found that any
liability of the employer must be founded on its own negligence. Even if a plaintiff
can recover under a vicarious liability theory, it may be inferred that if a patient
were able to recover on this basis, his recovery would be limited by the damages
cap of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1).
A-case pertinent to this inquiry was decided by the Colorado Supreme Court
in 1993. In Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C.,6' a patient underwent
unnecessary surgery and had his prostate gland removed due to an unlicensed, non-
professional lab technician's mislabeling of slides produced from a biopsy. The
patient sued the technician's employer under a theory of vicarious liability and
argued that the statutory liability cap of the Health Care Availability Act' did not
apply to the employer. The court found the employer vicariously liable and
covered by the cap. The court reasoned that the negligent technician was a "health
care professional" for purposes of the Health Care Availability Act. 3 The court
also found that the professional corporations or entities were entitled to the
protection of the statutory cap in their capacities as both a health care provider and
as an employer. The reason behind allowing this limitation of liability for the
59. 663 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 779.
61. 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).
62. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-64-302 (1997):
The total amount recoverable for all damages for a course of care for all defendants in any
civil action for damages in tort brought against a health care professional... or a health care
institution... shall not exceed one million dollars, present value per patient, including any
derivative claim by any other claimant, of which not more than two hundred fifty thousand
dollars, shall be attributable to noneconomic loss or injury.
63. The HCAA defines a health care professional as "any person licensed in this state or any other
state to practice medicine, chiropractic, nursing, physical therapy, podiatry, dentistry, pharmacy,
optometry, or other healing arts. The term includes any professional corporation or other professional




purpose of vicarious liability is clear:
[N]umerous, perhaps even the vast majority of, medical procedures
require the assistance of unlicensed individuals.... [Tihe legislature
sought to prevent a plaintiff from naming some unlicensed employee
whose conduct may have contributed to plaintiff's injuries as a defendant
(in addition to the professional entity itself under a theory of respondeat
superior) and thereby avoid application of the HCAA ....
... [Tihe negligent conduct of unlicensed employees... who contribute
to providing health care services affects the insurance premiums that
health care providers pay, just as the conduct of professionals within
those entities does."
Therefore, the court found that the plaintiff could not circumvent the statutory cap
on damages by naming a negligent, non-professional employee and asserting that
the defendant health care provider was vicariously liable for the acts of its
employee. The court aptly recognized that insurance premiums are affected by the
costs of insuring the acts of such employees, as well.65
Similarly, in Louisiana, one of the primary goals of the Medical Malpractice
Act was to lower the cost of medical malpractice insurance thereby making
healthcare more affordable and available. This goal would be defeated if a plaintiff
were allowed to avoid the limitation on damages by suing a health care provider as
a vicariously liable employer. Medical malpractice insurance premiums would
inevitably rise as a result. In addition, Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.41(1)
cannot be construed to allow for such an inconsistent application of the damages
cap--so that a health care provider would be protected for its own negligence, an
employee of that health care provider would be protected for his negligence, but the
health care provider as employer would not be protected in claims for vicarious
liability for the negligence of the employee. Therefore, in Louisiana, a plaintiff
should not be allowed to circumvent the statutory cap on damages by claiming a
health care provider is vicariously liable for one of its employees.
IV. LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 40:1299.42(B)(1) INCLUDES
EXCLUSIVELY ECONOMIC INJURIES
Louisiana courts have held that where a physician causes an injury through an
act which is not included within the definition of "malpractice,"" the requirements
of the Medical Malpractice Act do not apply.' An economic injury, for purposes
of this comment, consists of monetary damage which does not arise as a result of
a physical injury. Although the applicability of the Act to a purely economic injury
has been considered for purposes of the requirement of the Medical Review Panel,
64. Scholz, 851 P.2d at 904-05.
65. Id. at 905.
66. See supra note 24.
67. Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577 (La. 1992).
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it has not been considered in a claim for a sum in excess of the statutory limit. The
following cases provide examples of situations in which such a question could
arise.
In Price v. City of Bossier City,s an employee had a slip and fall accident at
work and went to the hospital for treatment. In accordance with the policy of her
employer, she underwent a drug test after the completion of her examination for
injuries. The physician negligently interpreted the test results' and reported a
positive result to the employer. Consequently, the employee was discharged. The
court held that the employee was not required to initially submit her claim to a
Medical Review Panel "because the employee [was] not a patient as defined by the
act" for purposes of the drug screen.7° Justice Lemmon concurred in that decision
and stated, "[ln my view, economic injuries, at least in the absence of
accompanying physical injuries do not fall under the Act."' In his brief
concurrence, Lernmon cited Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1): "The
Medical Malpractice Act authorizes recovery, in a specified limited amount, 'for
all malpractice claims for injuries to or death of a patient....
Notably, the word "injuries" in the statute is not modified; the statute does not
say that only physical injuries fall within the statute. To the contrary, the statute
reads: "all malpractice claims for injuries." Certainly, the nature of a medical
malpractice claim does suggest a physical injury. However, to refuse physicians
the protection of the damages cap where an injury is economic would defeat the
purpose of the cap: to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance by allowing for
greater predictability in the amounts of claims. If economic injuries were not
subject to the cap of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1), the amount of
claims would be less predictable. Thus, Justice Lemmon should not make this
distinction where the law does not. In light of the clear, unambiguous wording of
the statute, claims for injuries-even exclusively economic injuries-fall within the
Medical Malpractice Act and should be subject to the requirements therein. Thus,
where an employee, such as the one in the Price case, seeks to recover from the
physician personally, her recovery should be limited to an amount within the
statutory limit for the loss of her employment and related injuries.
The plaintiff in Pena v. Fann73 was injured in an automobile accident, and at
the request of the defendant's insurer, went to a physician for an independent
medical examination. The physician determined that there was nothing wrong with
the plaintiff. Later, the plaintiff underwent surgery when it was discovered that he
68. 693 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1997).
69. Id. at 1170-71 (On the consent form for the drug screen, the employee "indicated that she...
had eaten poppy seed dressing shortly before the test.... The Mayo Clinic Report indicated that [the
employee] tested positive for morphine .... [but] cautioned that presence of morphine at low
concentration... may be due to poppy seed ingestion." Nevertheless, the physician reported a positive
result to the employer).
70. Id. at 1173 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 677 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
2000]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
actually had "a severe rotary subluxation caused by the accident and which was not
properly diagnosed or treated" by the physician.74 The court concluded that a
sufficient doctor-patient relationship existed for application of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.47, holding that the claim was premature because it had not been
submitted to a Medical Review Panel." That being so, the court's holding can be
extended. Because the plaintiff's claim is subject to the Medical Malpractice Act
for purposes of the Medical Review Panel, it should also fall under the statutory
cap on damages of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1) for both his
physical injuries and any economic injuries he may have sustained.
Suppose, for instance, that the plaintiff in Pena sued the physician for the loss
of his case against the defendant. Assume the doctor's finding that there was
nothing wrong with the plaintiff prevented him from recovering a substantial
amount from the defendant in an action arising out of the automobile accident.
Could the plaintiff recover more than the statutory amount from the doctor as a
result of the economic loss he sustained from losing his suit? Consider the
language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1): "for all malpractice
claims for injuries to or death of a patient." The plaintiff would have a
"malpractice claim" because the doctor's misdiagnosis is the basis for his claim.
The claim would be for an "injury to... a patient" because the plaintiff's claim is
for the economic injury he sustained as a result of the loss of his suit. Since the
statute does not distinguish between the kinds of injuries which are subject to the
damages cap, the courts should not do so either. In this hypothetical, obviously the
plaintiff's claim should be subject to a damages cap because, as required in the
statute, it is a malpractice claim for injuries to a patient.
For a second illustration of the application of the medical malpractice liability
cap to claims for economic injury, suppose a popular musician was misdiagnosed
with a terminal illness. As a result, the musician canceled a scheduled performance
and suffered a loss of $1,000,000 in profits from the show. The musician sued the
physician for that loss. Should the musician be allowed to recover more than the
allowable statutory amount? Would the claim for $1,000,000 fall under the
category of "all malpractice claims"? Would the claim be for "injuries to ... a
patient"? It seems that the claim would be a "malpractice claim" because it
involved a misdiagnosis. In addition, the claim would be for an "injur[y] to ... a
patient": an economic injury arising from the misdiagnosis of the patient. Again,
since the statute 6 does not distinguish between types of injuries, the fact that the
injury is economic should not preclude the application of the damages cap.
Furthermore, in negligence cases, courts have traditionally refused to allow
recovery for intangible economic loss unaccompanied by physical injury."' The so-
called "prohibitory rule" often acts as prima facia obstacle to any recovery in these
74. Id. at 1092.
75. Id. at 1093-94.
76. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (1992).
77. David W. Robertson, Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for Intangible Economic Loss:
Negligence Actions and the Tort of Interntional Interference With Contractual Relations., 46 La. L.
Rev. 737, 740-41 (1986).
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types of negligence cases.78 Therefore, if the musician recovers, his award should
be limited to $500,000. His $1,000,000 claim must be subject to the $500,000 cap
on damages, as required by Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1).
V. CONCLUSION
The damages cap came into existence "when a proliferation of medical
malpractice lawsuits resulted in higher costs of defensive medicine and decreased
access to patient care, [and] medical associations and government agencies
successfully partnered in every state and enacted tort reforms to protect licensed
health care providers from these suits." 9 The cap has been successful in providing
this protection for health care providers. A study of the frequency and severity of
malpractice claims from 1975 through 1984 concluded that the cap on awards has
reduced the awards by 23%. o
Another indication of the success of the cap in accomplishing its purpose is the
slowing rate of increase in average indemnity costs. From 1971 to 1975, the
average indemnity cost in Louisiana more than doubled: from approximately
$10,000.00 per claim to approximately $24,000.00 per claim"8 ' However, in 1984,
the average was approximately $36,000.00 per claim; thus, after the cap was
enacted, the indemnity cost had not yet doubled in the eight years since 1976.2
When Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1) is considered for purposes
of its application to claims for loss of consortium, vicarious liability, and economic
injury, it must be interpreted in light of its purpose: to lower medical malpractice
insurance premiums so that citizens of the State of Louisiana will receive the
benefit of affordable health care. Therefore, these three types of claims should be
subject to the statutory liability cap in order to conform with the intent of the
legislature expressed in the statutory language and to allow for affordable
malpractice insurance premiums and health care.
A single liability cap of $500,000 should apply to claims for loss of
consortium which arise from injury to a primary patient. This position has been
taken by Louisiana appellate courts. 3 The reasoning behind the limitation of
recovery for loss of consortium claims in medical malpractice cases is that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299(B)(1) allows for recovery for injuries to "a
patient." A loss of consortium claim, though valid, will not arise without the injury
to the patient himself. The consortium victim and the patient together cannot
78. Id. ("The prohibitory rule was bottomed on generalized fears of multitudinous claims and
limitless liability. These concerns have been called 'the floodgates argument."').
79. Joanne C. Marier, When Should Physicians Begin Thinking Like Lawyers?, Practice
Management Workshop Series for Residents & Fellows (Jan. 1997).
80. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment, at
7, Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp., 607 So. 2d 517 (La. 1992) (No. 92-0559).
81. Id. (based upon a combined database of Hartford, St. Paul. and Aetna).
82. Id.
83. Hollingsworth v. Bowers, 690 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Moody v. United Nat'l
Ins. Co., 657 So. 2d 236 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995).
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recover more for the injuries to "a patient" than the patient could alone." The
purpose of the statute, to allow for affordable medical care in Louisiana by limiting
malpractice insurance premiums, must guide its interpretation. The cap should not
be extended in ways the legislature did not intend. Therefore, claims for loss of
consortium resulting from medical malpractice should be subject to a single,
statutory liability cap.
The theory of vicarious liability is often applicable in cases of medical
malpractice. Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.41 (1), which includes employees
of health care providers within its definition of protected "health care providers,"
provides authority for the conclusion that vicarious liability cannot be a means of
circumventing the damages cap. In order to conform to the purpose of the statute,
claims for vicarious liability must be subject to the damages cap to allow for lower
malpractice insurance premiums and lower health care costs.
Economic injuries are "injuries" within the meaning of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1). Therefore, claims arising from these injuries are
subject to the statutory limitation on recovery. In some cases, Louisiana courts
have held the Medical Malpractice Act applicable for purposes of submission to
a Medical Review Panel.85 The reasoning in these cases may be extended to allow
for application of the damages cap. Because a solely economic injury falls within
the requirement of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1) of "malpractice
claims for injuries to... a patient," these claims must be subject to the damages
cap.
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Legislature... decided, within
its prerogative, to put a three year absolute limit on a person's right to sue for legal
malpractice, just as it would be within its prerogative not to allow legal malpractice
actions at all." ' If the legislature can disallow legal malpractice actions, the same
should be true for medical malpractice actions. A fortiori, if the legislature can
disallow this type of action, certainly it can place limitations on recovery in that
action. This is exactly what the legislature has done by enacting the liability cap
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1). In accordance with the intent of
the legislature as expressed in the language of this statute, claims for loss of
consortium, vicarious liability, and economic injury should be subject to the cap on
damages.
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84. See Todd v. Sauls, 647 So. 2d 1366, 1381 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
85. Price v. City of Bossier City, 693 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1997); Pena v. Fann, 677 So. 2d 1091 (La.
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